During my courthouse site assessments, the security personnel who accompany me often tell me that the facility used for unloading and loading transport vehicles at the prisoner entrance can be the weakest link in the chain of prisoner movements.
Moving a prisoner from the entrance to the courtroom involves a series of prisoner facilities connected in a specific sequence. Movement between each facility requires separation from the circulation patterns of judges, court employees, and the public. Transportation between and within facilities also requires its own security protocols.
This article examines some of the factors that can make a difference in the entry and exit facility functioning successfully – or completely failing.
The Chain
Moving prisoners by law enforcement or court security personnel from a local detention facility to a courtroom involves the following steps:
- Transporting by van or bus from the local detention center to the courthouse
- Unloading in a sallyport, in a secure garage, or at an exterior location adjacent to the courthouse
- Processing (fingerprinting, photos, etc.) within the central cellblock area
- Awaiting trial in the central cellblock
- Moving from the cellblock through a secure hallway and elevator system to a courtroom holding cell accompanied by court security personnel
- Awaiting trial and waiting during recess periods in a courtroom holding cell
- Entering and exiting the courtroom from the courtroom holding cell (or release if found innocent or placed on bail)
- Moving from the courtroom holding cell through a secure hallway and elevator system back to the central cellblock accompanied by court security personnel
- Loading in a van or bus from a sallyport, a secure garage, or an exterior location to return to the local detention center
- Transporting by van or bus from the courthouse back to the local detention center
Today, we’re focusing on steps 2 and 9.
A Particularly Weak Link
One of the most problematic prisoner entrance situations I have encountered was in an Iowa courthouse. In the words of the chief courthouse security officer: “This situation is an ongoing nightmare.” Here is what I observed:
Separate circulation for prisoners was very good within the courthouse. However, the courthouse had no sallyport or secure parking garage. A public alley running the entire length of the rear of the courthouse provided access to three exposed surface parking spaces for judges and one adjacent parking space for unloading and loading a prisoner van. An additional parking space for deliveries completed the parking at the rear of the courthouse.
The judges and the prisoners all used the same compressed point of access to the courthouse via a ramp to the top of the small loading dock.
This arrangement allowed judges and prisoners to occasionally come into close proximity. It also allowed prisoners to observe the judges’ cars and license plates – a very dangerous situation.
But this was not the worst of it.
A homeless shelter was located at one end of the public alley. A public library was located at the other end. As a result, there was a steady stream of homeless pedestrians moving between the shelter and the library right behind the courthouse. Because the road was public, courthouse security had no ability to control this flow.
To further exacerbate this situation, one of the judges was inclined to use the alley as a place to give contributions to passing homeless persons, which was also beyond courthouse security’s control.
Often, the homeless pedestrians and the generous judge were present at the time the prisoner transport van was being loaded/unloaded, causing courthouse security personnel considerable difficulty in attempting to maintain proper control and creating a particularly chaotic and potentially dangerous situation.
After observing these conditions, I recommended closing the public alley and providing separate secured parking and separate courthouse entrances for the judges and prisoners. Regrettably, the city council did not agree with the recommendation and the alley remains open with the continued security risks.
More Weak Links
Unfortunately, I have observed many other examples where the rear loading dock is used for prisoner access. Although most do not create as many unsafe interactions between prisoners and other individuals as the Iowa example, they still do not provide a controlled and secure space for transferring prisoners to and from a van or bus.
The most common weak link in prisoner entrances I see is the use of a public street to park the prisoner transport van or bus while transferring prisoners through a side door. Obviously, this arrangement creates a potentially unsafe interaction with pedestrians and places additional pressure on law enforcement officers to maintain control of both the prisoners and the movement of nearby pedestrians.
Another common and less-than-secure arrangement is the use of a parking space within a secure judges’ and staff parking garage Often the judges and prisoners are required to use the same entrance to the courthouse from the garage, which require proximate parking spaces for the judges’ cars and the prisoner transport van or bus.
The ideal solution in these unsafe conditions is the use of a formal sallyport to securely transfer prisoners between a van or bus and the courthouse interior.
The Sallyport
The use of a sallyport in a courthouse is intended to accomplish the following security objectives:
- Separate prisoners from judges, court employees, and the public, including eliminating the ability of prisoners to identify judges’ vehicles
- Assure the safety of law enforcement personnel
- Avoid opportunities for a prisoner to escape
For many court jurisdictions, there are a comprehensive set of standards that apply to the design of a sallyport. These include standards for minimum dimensions, door functions, lighting, power supply, access controls, alarms, communications systems, vehicle sensors, and CCTV coverage. These standards cover both general architectural requirements and detailed technical requirements. The following list of typical standards are limited to general architectural guidelines:
- The sallyport may be located adjacent to the courthouse or within the courthouse structure
- To avoid back-up maneuvers, a drive-through sallyport layout is preferred
- The sallyport must be limited to the exclusive use of prisoner transport vehicles and must accommodate vans (no less than 950 sf) or buses (no less than 1,850 sf) if the latter is part of the prisoner vehicle fleet
- A minimum of five feet clearance should be allowed on all sides of each transport vehicle within the sallyport
- All perimeter sallyport walls should extend from the floor to the structural slab above and be constructed of glazed masonry units reinforced with rebar
- The ceiling should be an exposed structural slab or metal deck with a minimum height of 14 feet
- If an door is required from the sallyport to the exterior, a man-trap type door should be provided
- In large courthouse facilities with a bus-sized sallyport, a temporary holding cell within the sallyport should be provided for staging prisoner movement
- The vehicle entry door should be a roll-up, overhead, coiling type door
- The vehicle entry door should be solid to restrict visibility from outside and inside the sallyport, insulated to accommodate local weather, and constructed of high-impact-resistant material
- A vehicle barrier system (VBS) should be provided in front of all sallyport doors at all locations where the entrance is located directly off a public street or alley
The Missouri courthouse sallyport shown in the following photo and plan represents a nearly ideal layout for a sallyport.
I know of no clearer example of the value of a sallyport than the following situation, described to me by a senior courthouse security officer involving a carefully planned transfer of three high-risk prisoners facing gang-related drug charges: As the first prisoner stepped out of the van inside the sallyport, he feigned sever stomach cramps. When one of the two accompanying officers bent down to help him, he and the other officer were both overpowered by the prisoners. The prisoners were able to gain keys to unlock their handcuffs with the intention of escaping.
However, all three of the previously noted objectives of a sallyport proved effective in avoiding an undesirable outcome; separating prisoners, assuring personnel safety, and eliminating escape.
The prisoners were unable to break out of the electronically locked sallyport doors. The incident was observed on CCTV in real time and several armed security officers from the adjacent squad room entered the sallyport to subdue the prisoners. The original two officers were not hurt, and no one from the judiciary or members of the public had been placed at risk.
Had the transfer from the van occurred outside at a loading dock or in a side-street, the outcome may have been very different.
Simply stated, there is no adequate substitute for a properly designed sallyport that can provide the necessary level of security at the prisoner entrance.
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